Comparative Politics (Political Science): Authoritarian Regimes – Networks of Power

Instructor: Franziska Keller

Course Overview: This course will deal with regimes which - depending on what measurement you use – still rule more than half the countries of the world, and certainly were the vast majority of regimes in the past: autocracies. While political scientists have spent much time categorizing, theorizing and analyzing democracies, the study of authoritarian regimes was until recently the domain of area studies and country experts. The main goal of this course is to familiarize ourselves with the comparative research and theories on authoritarian regimes that have emerged during the last decade.

A second goal is to explore a specific tool or approach for analyzing authoritarian regimes that has gained prominence during the last decade as well: social network analysis. You might have heard about social network analysis in different contexts, e.g. studies on social media like facebook, twitter and other blogs. But conceptualizing regimes as social networks connecting the leader with his or her entourage and supporters, which in turn are connected to the wider society and even the opposition – with their own, specific networks – can also help us understand authoritarian regimes better.

However, most social network analysis pertaining to authoritarian regimes so far only looks at opposition networks (week 9). The challenge and fun of this class will thus be to explore how abstract network concepts help us understand the power struggle between factions in single-party regimes like China, or how insights gained from price-rigging conspiracies or the rise of the Medici family in Renaissance Italy apply to modern authoritarian regimes. You will have to opportunity to come up with applications, hypotheses, and appropriate tests in several writing/thinking assignments that will be part of your final grade.

What this course is not: the focus of this class is on the authoritarian regime itself, how it works internally and maintains itself. We will be less concerned about how regimes come about: an extensive literature on which social and economic conditions are conducive to democracy and dictatorship already deals with this subject (see further readings in week 2). We also will not focus on different policy outcomes between democratic and authoritarian regimes, but there exist many comparisons in terms of economic growth and international cooperation ("democratic peace"), if you are interested in that topic.

The literature on this syllabus is divided into required, recommended, and further readings. Readings marked as "A" deal mainly with authoritarian regimes themselves, while "N" indicates network analysis articles. "Specific" are readings on individual countries.

Instructions for undergraduate class: You are responsible for reading all the articles and book chapters listed under "required" ahead of class and write a total of three response papers, each 3-5 pages long. The first response paper is due before the end of the 4th week, the 2nd before the end of the 8th week and the 3rd before the end of the 12th week. Your response paper should address one of the questions asked in the paragraph "Writing/Thinking assignment" and you should also skim the recommended readings of that particular week in order to answer it. A response paper on a given topic has to be turned on Sunday evening before the topic is treated in class.

For all other weeks, use the "Writing/Thinking assignment" paragraph as a guide for what to focus on in the articles and book chapters.

There will be a final exam covering all the readings and content of the lectures at the end the semester.

The final exam will make up 40% of your grade, the response papers 15% each and participation in class 15%.

Instructions for MA/PhD class: You are expected to read everything listed under "required" and "recommended" and hold a 5-10 minute presentation on the readings assigned to you in the style of a discussant at a conference, i.e. a very brief summary of the main research question, theory, method and main findings, and a bit longer discussion of the paper's strengths and weaknesses and how to address the latter.

During the course of the class, you are expected to write three 3-5 page research proposals on possible topics for your term paper, one of which you will pick to expand into an actual term paper due before the beginning of the next semester. Aim to submit the first proposal before the end of the 4th week, the 2nd before the end of the 8th week and the 3rd before the end of the 12th week.

You will be able to present your final proposal and preliminary in the last two weeks of the course and receive feedback from your classmates and me.

The final paper will make up 70% of your grade, the research proposals 5% each and participation in class 15%.

Week 1: Introduction: What are authoritarian regimes? How do they differ from democratic regimes? Authoritarian regimes as "non-democracies"

For a long time, authoritarian regimes were mainly defined by what they were not: democratic. After giving you an outline of the coming sessions and clarifying any question on the course logistics, we will thus deal with the question of how to define democracy. There are no required readings for this week, but feel free to look through the articles in the further reading section.

Further reading:

A: Przeworski, Adam. 1999. Minimalist conception of democracy: a defense. In Shapiro, I. and Hacker-Cordon, C., (editors): *Democracy's Values*. Cambridge Univ Press. 23-55. *Focus on pp 43-50.*

A: Levitsky, S., and L. A Way. 2002. 'The rise of competitive authoritarianism'. *Journal of Democracy* 13(2): 51–65.

A: Collier, David, and Steven Levitsky. 1997. 'Democracy with Adjectives: Conceptual Innovation in Comparative Research'. *World Politics* 49(3): 430–451.

Week 2: What are authoritarian regimes? Theories of autocracies

As mentioned above, Theories of Autocracy – unlike Theories of Democracy – have not been that common in Political Science. If anything, autocracies are often treated under the more general heading of "State Formation" or "State Theory". Bueno de Mesquita et al (2003) introduces you to one of the more influential recent general theory of autocracies (and democracies), one on which Svolik (2012) builds as well. The further reading list contains a few earlier attempts at building such theories, some of which are still often quoted "classics" (Linz 2000, Huntington 1968), provide a first overview of autocracies (Brooker 2000, Tullock 1987), or deal with the question of under which circumstances democracies or autocracies emerge (Acemoğlu & Robinson 2006).

Required:

A: Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. The MIT Press: Chapter 2 & 3 (The Theory: Definitions and Intuition): 38-76.

A: Svolik, Milan W. 2012: *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press: Chapter 1 (Introduction: The Anatomy of Dictatorship): 1-18.

Recommended:

A: Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce et al. 2003. *The Logic of Political Survival*. The MIT Press: Chapter 3 (A Model of the Selectorate Theory): 77-126.

Other books with theories of autocracies / further readings:

A: Brooker, Paul. 2009. *Non-Democratic Regimes: Second Edition*. Second Edition. Palgrave Macmillan.

A: Linz, Juan. 2000: *Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

A: Huntington, Samuel, P. 1968. *Political Order in Changing Societies*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

A: Tullock, Gordon. 1987. *Autocracy*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

A: Acemoğlu, Daron, and James A. Robinson. 2006. *Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Cambridge University Press.

If you like Bueno de Mesquita et al's "Selectorate Theory", but find the math of the "Logic of Political Survival" and some of their articles too daunting, then have a look at the following:

A: Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2012. *The Dictator's Handbook: Why Bad Behavior is Almost Always Good Politics*. PublicAffairs.

Writing / Thinking assignment: Take a country you are familiar with (preferably one that you would consider to be ruled by an authoritarian regime). Who in this country is the ruler? Who belongs to the selectorate, and who doesn't? Who belongs to the winning coalition? Who doesn't? How did you decide which inhabitants of that country belong to which group? Support your arguments with quotes from the readings.

Week 3: Social Network Analysis: the basics

This week introduces you to some basic concepts and ideas of Social Network Analysis. We will look at some of them in more depth in the network readings for each week, but to make sure that you've understood most of what is mentioned in Easley & Kleinberg (2010) and Jackson (2008), there will be an online quiz to fill out before week 4's session.

Helmke & Levitsky (2004) help us further motivate our "network approach to authoritarian regimes", because formal institutions (i.e. organizations and rules specified in the constitution or in written laws) usually don't play an important role in authoritarian regimes. Hence we need to find a way to discover and analyse informal institutions, which often take on the form of social networks.

We will discuss how formal institutions map onto and influence the shape of social networks more closely in weeks 11-13).

Required:

N: Easley, David and Jon Kleinberg (2010): "Chapter 2 - Graphs" and "Chapter 3 – Strong and Weak Ties" in: ibid.: *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World*. Cambridge University Press, 2010: 23-32 & 40-44 & 47-64.

N: Granovetter, M. S. 1973. 'The strength of weak ties'. *American journal of sociology*: 1360–1380.

Recommended:

N: Jackson, Matthew O. 2008. *Social and Economic Networks*. Princeton UP. Chapters 2.1 - 2.2.3. 20-37.

A: Helmke, Gretchen, and Steven Levitsky. 2004. 'Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda'. *Perspectives on Politics* 2(04): 725–740.

Writing / Thinking assignment: Which informal institutions would you try to model or conceptualize as networks? Which informal institutions do not lend themselves that easily to network analysis?

Week 4: Power

The adage that politics is all about power seems especially true in authoritarian regimes. If becoming the ruler or part of the wining coalition depends on having power, how do we measure power? Weber (1968) and Lukes (1974) offer two classical definitions of power in sociology. Network Analysis has its own debates about how to measure or define power within a network (Brass & Krackhardt 2012).

Required:

A: Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press. Volume I, Chapter I, 16 & 17 (Power and Domination & Political and Hierocratic Organizations) 53-56.

A: Lukes, S. 1974. *Power: A radical view*. London Macmillan. Introduction & Chapter 1.

N: Brass Daniel J., and David M. Krackhardt (2012): "Power, Politics, and Social Networks in Organizations", in: Gerald R. Ferris and Darren C. Treadway (eds): *Politics in Organizations. Theory and Research Considerations*. Taylor & Francis: 355-375.

N: Easley, David and Jon Kleinberg (2010): "Chapter 3 – Strong and Weak Ties" and "Chapter 12 – Bargaining and Power in Networks" in: ibid.: *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World*. Cambridge University Press, 2010: 64-69 & 339-344.

Recommended

N: Jackson, Matthew O. 2008. *Social and Economic Networks*. Princeton UP. Chapter 2.2.4. (Centrality) 37- 43.

Writing / Thinking assignment: Do you find the claim that all power is relational (Brass & Knackhardt 2012) convincing? What aspects of Luke's and Weber's definitions are left out in such a claim?

Week 5: Typology of authoritarian regimes

This week introduces a classical typology of authoritarian regimes (Geddes 1999 & 2003) that is still widely used, and a recent criticism and alternative suggestion by Svolik (2012).

The recommended readings look at one particular type that lends itself especially well to network analysis: personalistic regimes with their ties between leader and followers.

Required:

A: Geddes, B. 1999. 'What do we know about democratization after twenty years?' *Annual Review of Political Science* 2(1): 115–144.

A: Svolik, Milan W. 2012: *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge University Press: Chapter 2 (The World of Authoritarian Politics): 19-52.

Recommended:

A: Jackson, R. H, and C. G Rosberg. 1982. *Personal rule in black Africa: prince, autocrat, prophet, tyrant*. University of California Press. 1-58 73-82.

A/Specific: Slater, Dan. 2003. Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia *Comparative Politics* 36 (1):81-101.

Further Reading:

A: Geddes, Barbara. 2003. *Paradigms and Sand Castles: Theory Building and Research Design in Comparative Politics*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Chapter 2 (Big Questions, Little Answers) & Appendix A (Classification Scheme for Coding Authoritarian Regimes): 27-88 & 225-232.

Writing / Thinking assignment: If you had to visualize Geddes' different regime types as social networks, how would they look like? Who would be the nodes, what would be the ties? What ties connect the regime to the citizens? To the opposition? Can you think of ways to test if your visualization is indeed a model that helps distinguish different regime types? What is the shape of the different networks? Can you think of an alternative typology of regimes that is based on the shape of the social network?

Week 6: The problem of authoritarian power-sharing: rising to the top

In the next weeks we will spend a lot of time analysing authoritarian regimes from the perspective of either the leader or a possible contender for leadership. But how do you become the leader or a credible contender for that position? Why would you join the party or other organizations associated with an authoritarian government (Schnytzer and Šušteršič 1998; Guo 2005)? And how do you rise further in the hierarchy of an authoritarian bureaucracy (Easter 1996; Shih et al 2012)? Or, if there are no clear structures, but instead a competing number of groups (factions, clans or families), how do you beat the others to the top (Padgett & Ansell 1993; Easter 1996)?

Required:

A: Schnytzer, A., and J. Šušteršič. 1998. 'Why join the party in a one-party system?: Popularity versus political exchange'. *Public Choice* 94(1): 117–134.

N: Easter, G. M. 1996. 'Personal Networks and Postrevolutionary State Building: Soviet Russia Reexamined'. *World Politics* 48(04): 551–578.

N: Padgett, J. F., and C. K. Ansell. 1993. 'Robust Action and the Rise of the Medici, 1400-1434'. *American journal of sociology*: 1259–1319. *Focus on pp 1259-1286.*

Recommended:

A: Shih, Victor, Christopher Adolph, and Mingxing Liu. 2012. 'Getting Ahead in the Communist Party: Explaining the Advancement of Central Committee Members in China'. *American Political Science Review* 106(01): 166–187.

Further Reading:

A: Guo, G. 2005. 'Party recruitment of college students in China'. *Journal of Contemporary China* 14(43): 371–393.

Writing / Thinking assignment: What advice would you give to a would-be dictator languishing in a clerk position as a network analyst? What strategies are effective if he or she wants to advance quickly?

Week 7: The problem of authoritarian power-sharing: controlling the winning coalition

   The remaining weeks will deal with what an authoritarian leader can do to remain in power – to use Svolik's (2012) words, how to solve the problem of authoritarian power-sharing and authoritarian control. This week deals most explicitly with the former. With what kind of threats and promises can he or she keep contenders and conspirators at bay? And why would any potential conspirator ever believe such promises?

Required:

A: Magaloni, B., and R. Kricheli. 2010. 'Political Order and One-Party Rule'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 13: 123-143.

A: Quinlivan, James T. 1999. 'Coup-proofing: Its Practice and Consequences in the Middle East'. *International Security* 24(2): 131–165.

N: Baker, W. E., and R. R. Faulkner. 1993. 'The social organization of conspiracy: Illegal networks in the heavy electrical equipment industry'. *American Sociological Review*: 837–860.

Recommended:

A: Magaloni, B. 2008. 'Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule'. *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4/5): 715-741.

N/A: Willerton Jr, J. P. 1987. 'Patronage networks and coalition building in the Brezhnev era'. *Europe-Asia Studies* 39(2): 175–204.

Further reading:

N/A: Perez-Oviedo, Wilson (2012): "Divide and Conquer: Noisy Communication in Networks, Power, and Wealth Distribution", in: Perez-Oviedo, Wilson (2012): *Networks, Dictators and Underdevelopment: A Game Theory Approach*. LAP LAMBERT Academic Publishing.

Specific: Nathan, Andrew J. 1973. 'A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics'. *The China Quarterly* (53): 34–66.

A/Specific: Darden, Keith. 2008. 'The Integrity of Corrupt States: Graft as an Informal State Institution'. *Politics Society* 36(1): 35–59.

Writing / Thinking assignment: Take Quinlivan's coup-proofing strategies and try to illustrate them using graphs – how would a network look like after and before the strategy is applied? What are the nodes, what are the ties of in that network? Perez-Oviedo might give you some ideas where to start, if you take his model to apply more to a game between the dictator and his cronies than between the dictator and the masses.

Week 8: Staying in Power: Winning Hearts and Minds – Legitimacy and Ideology

This week deals most explicitly with how to solve the problem of authoritarian control (Svolik 2012). In particular, we look at how regimes create "narratives" that justify their rule (Wedeen 1999 and March 2003). Keep Lukes (1974) from week 4 in mind during the readings.

Required:

A: Wedeen, Lisa. 1999. *Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, Chapters 1 & 3: 1-31, 67-86.

A: Geddes, Barbara, and John Zaller. 1989. Sources of Popular Support for Authoritarian Regimes. *American Journal of Political Science* 33 (2):319-347.

N: Easley, David and Jon Kleinberg (2010): "Chapter 16 - Information Cascades" in: ibid.: *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World*. Cambridge University Press, 2010: 483-489, 500-505.

Recommended:

A: Weber, Max. 1968. *Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology*, edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. New York: Bedminster Press. Book I, Chapter III (Types of Legitimate Domination). 212-221 & 226-232 & 241-251.

Specific: March, A. F. 2003. 'State ideology and the legitimation of authoritarianism: the case of post-Soviet Uzbekistan'. *Journal of Political Ideologies* 8(2): 209–232.

Writing / Thinking assignment: Can we integrate ideas about ideology (e.g. by Wedeen 1999) into network analysis (Easley and Kleinberg 2010)?

Week 9: Opposition and Resistance

Social network analysis has been quite popular for studying opposition movements and recruitment into such movements. We will look at some of the classics (McAdam 1986, Kuran 1991 & 1997, Opp & Gern 1993) and some of the underlying mechanisms of "cascades" (Easly & Kleinberg 2010) in networks. Simulations (Siegel 1009) and experiments (Fowler & Christakis 2010) help illustrate those mechanisms.

Required:

N: McAdam, D. 1986. 'Recruitment to high-risk activism: The case of Freedom Summer'. *American Journal of Sociology*: 64–90.

A: Kuran, Timur. 1991. 'Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of 1989'. *World Politics* 44(1): 7–48.

N: Easley, David and Jon Kleinberg (2010): "Chapter 19 – Cascading Behavior in Networks" in: ibid.: *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World*. Cambridge University Press, 2010: 563-609.

Recommended:

A/N: Opp, K. D., and C. Gern. 1993. 'Dissident groups, personal networks, and spontaneous cooperation: The East German revolution of 1989'. *American Sociological Review*: 659–680.

N: Siegel, D. A. 2009. 'Social networks and collective action'. *American Journal of Political Science* 53(1): 122–138.

N: Fowler, James H., and Nicholas A. Christakis. 2010. 'Cooperative behavior cascades in human social networks'. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 107(12): 5334–5338.

Further Reading:

A: Kuran, T. 1997. *Private truths, public lies: The social consequences of preference falsification*. Harvard University Press.

N: Jackson, Matthew O. 2008.: "Diffusion Through Networks," in ibid.: *Social and Economic Networks*, Princeton UP: 185-222.

Specific: Radnitz, S. 2005. 'Networks, localism and mobilization in Aksy, Kyrgyzstan'. *Central Asian Survey* 24(4): 405–424.

A: Scott, James C. 1992. *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Reading/Thinking assignment: What kind of societies are especially vulnerable to sudden cascades? How would the social network of a vulnerable society look like?

Week 10: Staying in Power: Repression

Authoritarian leaders can react in two ways to popular protest – either with concessions or repression (for an explanation about who will react in which way, see Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2009). But repression can often lead to backlash (Francisco 2005). So when does repression work (Siegel 2011, Lyall 2006)? And how does it connect to the wider network literature on robustness (Albert et al. 2000, Watts 2004)?

Required:

A: Francisco, Ronald A. 2005. The Dictator's Dilemma. In *Repression and Mobilization*, edited by C. Davenport, H. Johnston and C. Mueller. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 58-83.

N: Watts, Duncan J. 2004. *Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age*. W. W. Norton & Company. Chapter 9 (Innovation, Adaptation, and Recovery). 253-290.

N: Albert, R, H Jeong and A. Barbasi. 2000. "Error and attack tolerance of complex networks," Nature 406, 378-382.

Recommended:

N: Siegel, David A. 2011. 'When Does Repression Work? Collective Action in Social Networks'. *Journal of Politics* 73(4): 993–1010.

Specific (N): Lyall, J. M. K. 2006. 'Pocket Protests. Rhetorical Coercion and the Micropolitics of Collective Action in Semiauthoritarian Regimes'. *World Politics* 58: 378–412.

Further Reading:

A: Davenport, Christian. 2007. 'State repression and political order'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 10: 1–23.

A: Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2009. 'Political Survival and Endogenous Institutional Change'. *Comparative Political Studies* 42(2): 167–197.

Specific (A): Lorentzen, Peter. 2006. Regularized Rioting: Strategic Toleration of Popular Protest in China. *Working Paper*.

Reading/Thinking assignment: Read Watts (2004). Draw the (information flow) network of Toyota-Aisin. Draw the network of a "traditional" company. (a) Imagine that those two networks are instead the networks of an authoritarian government with you, the dictator, taking the position of the CEO. In which network would you rather be the dictator? Why?

(b) Now imagine that the same network is that of a revolutionary movement in an authoritarian regime. Which one is more likely to be successful? Why?

Read Siegel (2011) and Albert et al. (2000). Using their insights, how would improve your network chosen in (a) and (b)?

Week 11: Staying in Power: Institutions 1 – Structures and Organizations

How do institutions increase regime durability? The next three weeks deal with institutions that resemble democratic institutions on the outside (parties, parliaments, elections) – but might serve different functions in an authoritarian regime. Continuing with the question of how the dictator can react to (potentially) unruly masses, we explore how he can offer concessions instead of resorting to repression. Gandhi and Przeworski (2007, 2006) suggest that institutions like parliaments and councils – even if not elected in free and fair elections – can facilitate soliciting and granting concessions. Lust-Okar (2009, & Jamal, 2002) show how formal institutions can be used to manage and form informal networks.

A: Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. 'Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats'. *Comparative Political Studies* 40(11): 1279–1301.

A: Lust-Okar, E. 2009. 'Reinforcing Informal Institutions through Authoritarian Elections: Insights from Jordan'. *Middle East Law and Governance* 1(1): 3–37.

N: Easley, David and Jon Kleinberg (2010): "Chapter 4 – Networks in Their Surrounding Contexts" in: ibid.: *Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning about a Highly Connected World*. Cambridge University Press, 2010: 85-97.

Recommended:

A: Smith, Benjamin B. 2005. Life of the Party: The Origins of Regime Breakdown and Persistence under Single-Party Rule. *World Politics* 57 (3):421-451.

A: Acemoglu, D., G. Egorov, and K. Sonin. 2008. 'Coalition formation in non-democracies'. *The Review of Economic Studies* 75(4): 987–1009.

Further Reading:

A: Lust-Okar, E., and A. A Jamal. 2002. 'Rulers and rules: reassessing the influence of regime type on electoral law formation'. *Comparative Political Studies* 35(3): 337–366.

A: Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2006. 'Cooperation, Cooptation, and Rebellion Under Dictatorships'. *Economics & Politics* 18(1): 1-26.

Writing / Thinking assignment: How do (formal) institutions relate to (informal) networks? Find examples of how an autocrat can use institutions to shape networks.

Week 12: Staying in Power: Institutions 2 – Elections, fraud, and vote-buying

Almost all authoritarian regimes hold popular elections – even North Korea![1] But if elections (and especially electoral fraud) can spark revolutions (Tucker 2007), why would an autocrat hold elections (Gandhi & Lust-Okar 2009)? This week's readings suggest some answers to this paradox and explain why and how incumbents almost never loose such elections.

One way of ensuring victory in elections is through fraud and vote-buying (Lehoucq 2003). But at least in the latter case, the leader needs an extensive network (a "machine") that can channel rewards to the individual voters. Wang and Kurzman (2007) give us a first-hand account of the vote-buying practices of the Kuomintang in a township in Taiwan.

Stokes (2006), Murillo and Calvo (2013), and Gonzalez-Ocantos et al (2010) all use survey data to support their claims about vote-buying, which allows us to talk about the value of survey data in an authoritarian context, where social desirability bias is an even bigger problem than in more open societies. Their surveys introduce possible ways to alleviate that bias (indirect questions and list experiments).

A: Gandhi, J., and E. Lust-Okar. 2009. 'Elections Under Authoritarianism'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 12: 403–422.

A: Lehoucq, F. 2003. 'Electoral fraud: Causes, types, and consequences'. *Annual Review of Political Science* 6(1): 233–256.

A/N: Wang, Chin-Shou, and Charles Kurzman. 2007. 'The logistics: how to buy votes'. In Fredric Charles Schaffer (Eds): *Elections for sale: the causes and consequences of vote buying*. Lynne Rienner. 61–78.

Recommended:

A/N: Murillo, Maria Victoria and Ernesto Calvo 2013. "When Parties Meet Voters: Partisan Networks and Distributive Expectations in Argentina and Chile.*" Comparative Political Studies* (forthcoming 2013).

A: Stokes, Susan C. 2005. 'Perverse Accountability: A Formal Model of Machine Politics with Evidence from Argentina'. *American Political Science Review* 99(03): 315–325.

Further Reading:

A: Tucker, J. A. 2007. 'Enough! Electoral fraud, collective action problems, and post-communist colored revolutions'. *Perspectives on Politics* 5(03): 535–551.

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[1] Exceptions include some Gulf monarchies and China on the national level.

A: Gonzalez-Ocantos, Ezequiel et al. 2010. 'Vote buying and social desirability bias: Experimental evidence from Nicaragua'. *American Journal of Political Science* 56(1): 202-217.

Writing / Thinking assignment: What kind of networks are useful for what kind of electoral manipulation or fraud? Can you think of a way to measure such networks to test you hypothesis?

Week 13: Staying in Power: Patronage and Clientelism

As we have seen in weeks 6 and 7, patronage networks play a major role in the politics of (controlling) the elite. But they also extend outwards to the citizens, as last week as shown, and can be used for vote-buying. Even outside the election cycle (or absent elections taking place) those networks remain relevant, as Chubb (1981) and Scott (1972) show.

Required:

A: Chubb, J. 1981. 'The social bases of an urban political machine: the case of Palermo'. *Political Science Quarterly* 96(1): 107–125.

A/N: Scott, J. C. 1972. 'Patron-client politics and political change in Southeast Asia'. *The American Political Science Review*: 91–113.

MA/PhD: paper presentations

Week 14: The international arena: diffusion of democracy and autocratic learning

At the end of the semester, we return to the initial question of democratization. In week 9 we have seen how protest behaviour can cascade through a network of individuals and lead to a revolution. But protest behaviour often spreads not just within a society, but also from country to country (Beissinger 2007) – a cascade in a network in which the nodes are not individuals, but geographic units like countries, with ties indicating geographic closeness (e.g. sharing a border), other shared similarities (Jackson 2010), or the presence of ties between NGO activists (Rosenberg 2011). How and why does this happen? And if protest can spread, do anti-protest measures as well? The latter idea of "autocratic learning" has gained interest among researchers of authoritarian regimes (Ambrosio 2010).

Required:

A: Beissinger, M. R. 2007. 'Structure and example in modular political phenomena: The diffusion of Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions'. *Perspectives on Politics* 5(02): 259–276.

A: Rosenberg, T. 2011. 'Revolution U: what Egypt learned from the students who overthrew Milosevic'. *Foreign Policy*.

Recommended:

A: Jackson, N. J. (2010). "The role of external factors in advancing non-liberal democratic forms of political rule: a case study of Russia's influence on Central Asian regimes". *Contemporary Politics* Vol. 16, No. 1, March 2010, 101–118.

Further Reading:

A: Ambrosio, T. 2010. 'Constructing a Framework of Authoritarian Diffusion: Concepts, Dynamics, and Future Research'. *International studies perspectives* 11(4): 375–392.

MA/PhD: paper presentations